The Information
the Decision Is Built On

Every decision in the problem-solving sequence is built on top of information — about the aircraft state, the operational environment, the available options, the constraints that apply. The quality of that information determines the quality of everything that follows. A diagnosis built on inaccurate information produces a correct response to the wrong problem. An option generation process working from incomplete information will miss the option that would have been best. A decision reached without the relevant procedural reference may produce an outcome that is operationally unsafe.

Seeks accurate and adequate information from appropriate sources is the behaviour that ensures the foundation is sound before anything is built on it. It has three distinct components — seeking, accuracy, and appropriateness — and each carries operational significance that is worth understanding separately.

Seeking: Knowing Where to Look

Information does not present itself at the moment it is required. It has to be found — from the right source, at the right time, in the right form for the decision that needs to be made. The crew member who knows where to look arrives at decisions with the correct inputs. The crew member who does not may make decisions from whatever information happens to be immediately accessible, whether or not it is the most relevant or reliable.

This is where knowledge — the Application of Knowledge competency — feeds directly into Problem Solving and Decision Making. Knowing that a specific answer is in the QRH, that a performance limit is in the FCOM, that a regulatory requirement is in the operations manual, that a weather update is available through ATIS or company ops — that mental map of the information landscape is itself a behaviour. The crew member who has maintained their knowledge of the source structure can navigate it under pressure. The crew member whose knowledge of available sources is approximate will navigate it approximately, and may not find what they need before the decision point requires commitment.

Accurate: The Currency Problem

Accuracy is not a fixed property of information. It has a timestamp. The procedure that was accurate last month may have been amended. The performance figure that was correct on the previous variant may not apply to this one. The airspace structure that was current at the last recurrent may have changed. Information that was accurate at the time it was acquired can become inaccurate without announcement — and the crew member who applies it without checking currency is applying information that may no longer be correct.

This is the discipline argument. Keeping knowledge current — attending to amendments, maintaining awareness of changes to procedures and regulations and airspace, ensuring that the information base from which decisions are made reflects the present rather than a recent past — is not administrative housekeeping. It is the maintenance of accuracy in the inputs to decision-making. A decision made from current information has the best available foundation. A decision made from information that has been superseded has a foundation that may already be wrong.

Currency applies to all sources. The aircraft manuals that have been revised. The company procedures that have been updated since the last training event. The navigation charts that reflect current airspace rather than previous configurations. The performance data that applies to the current aircraft configuration, not a previous one. Each of these requires active maintenance — which is what the discipline of knowledge currency provides.

The Transposition Threat

There is a specific accuracy threat that belongs to experienced crew members more than inexperienced ones: the false transposition of information from one context to another. The procedure that was standard at the previous operator. The performance figure that applied to the previous type. The SOP sequence that was correct under the previous regulatory framework. Applied without conscious verification against the current context, these are sources of inaccuracy dressed as knowledge.

This is the danger of anecdotal information — not that it is invented, but that it is real in one context and may not be real in another. The crew member who has operated many types, with many operators, in many regulatory environments, has a rich and genuinely valuable operational experience base. That base also contains more opportunities for false transposition than a crew member with a narrower history. The breadth that makes experienced crew members valuable is the same breadth that makes them vulnerable to applying the right answer to the wrong question.

The protection is verification. Before applying information from operational experience — particularly where it may have been acquired on a different type, with a different operator, under different procedures — check it against the current applicable source. The check costs seconds. The consequence of not checking, when the transposition is material, can be significant.

Appropriate Sources: The Landscape Is Known

The appropriate sources for information in professional aviation are well-defined. Manufacturer documentation — the FCOM, the QRH, the performance manual — provides the authoritative reference for aircraft systems, procedures and limitations. The company manual suite — operations manual, route manual, company procedures — provides the operator-specific layer. Regulatory material provides the framework within which both operate. ATC, ATIS, SIGMET, company operations — these provide the current operational picture.

The landscape is not ambiguous. The sources are known, their authority is understood, and the crew member who has maintained their familiarity with the structure can navigate it reliably. The challenge is not identifying what the appropriate sources are. It is the discipline of actually consulting them — rather than relying on memory, on anecdote, or on information that was accurate once — when the decision requires it.

Operational experience is also a source — and a genuinely valuable one. The accumulated knowledge of many sectors, many non-normals, many situations managed and lessons learned, contributes to the quality of decisions in ways that documented sources cannot fully replicate. But operational experience is also the source most subject to the transposition threat, and the one most requiring conscious verification against current applicable documentation before it is applied. It is the most richly informative source and the most carefully handled one.